To obtain further information about Ellington Management Group:
General Inquiries:
Richard Brounstein
Vice Chairman
Ellington Management Group, L.L.C.
53 Forest Avenue
Old Greenwich, CT 06870
Tel: (203)-698-1200
Fax: (203)-637-8551
Email:
investor@ellington.com

 

About Mortgage Backed Securities

Brief History of the MBS Market
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, most mortgage-backed securities were issued in pass-through form. Pass-throughs are participations in the cash flows from pools of individual home mortgages, have long maturities and the potential for early repayment of principal. In 1983, a dramatic fall in mortgage rates and a surging housing market caused mortgage origination to almost double. Much of this production was sold in the capital markets.

To accommodate this surge in supply, financial engineers created an investment vehicle that would broaden the existing MBS investor base. In mid 1983 the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation issued the first collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO). It was a three class structure that offered short, intermediate and long term securities from the cash flows of a pool of mortgages. The development of CMOs has allowed more investors to become active in the MBS market.

The U.S. mortgage backed securities market has grown significantly since the creation of the first collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) in 1983. In fact the CMO sector has become the dominant sector within the mortgage market. CMOs are basically large pools of mortgage cash flows that are carved up and structured into different types of securities. The creation of the CMO gave investors a near U.S. treasury credit quality, customized performance characteristics, attractive yields across a range of maturities, and a variety of risk and return profiles to fit investors’ needs. The MBS market has come a long way since 1983. A major breakthrough was the introduction of REMICs in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which created efficient tax treatment for both issuers and investors. The CMO market continues to grow at a rapid pace. Annual CMO issuance has grown from just $5 billion in 1983, to $312 billion 1992, and to about $820 billion in 2004. This growth has helped fuel similar growth in the agency mortgage pass-through market. Agency pass-through issuance has grown from $53 billion in 1982 to $1.01 trillion in 2004.

In addition to agency CMO issuance, there has developed a market backed by nonconforming mortgages and issued by non-agency entities (known as whole loan or private label CMOs). In 2004 whole loan CMO issuance was $478 billion, and at Feb 2005 the outstanding balance of whole loan CMOs was approximately $784.2 billion.

The Risk Inherent in MBS Securities
There are several risks that an investor must be aware of when buying a CMO. These consist of prepayment risk, interest rate risk, yield curve risk, index risk (LIBOR, CMT, COFI etc), duration risk and structure risk. All of these potential risks must be analyzed and considered before one can make an educated decision on buying a CMO.

Prepayment risk
Prepayments are the primary feature that differentiates the MBS market from other fixed income sectors. A prepayment is the early repayment of mortgage principal that results from the sale of a home, or the refinancing or partial principal pay down (curtailment) of an existing mortgage. Prepayments result from two causes: housing turnover and refinancing. Since most mortgages are not assumable, the sale of a home results in a full repayment of the current loan balance. Various factors such as economic activity, seasonality (time of year), and family migration patterns affect the level of housing turnover. Refinancing occurs when borrowers take out new mortgages (at lower rates) and pay off existing ones. Since most U. S. residential mortgages do not carry a prepayment penalty, the decision to refinance is driven by interest rates. As mortgage rates decline, a homeowner may choose to refinance his existing mortgage with a lower rate mortgage. The size of the refinancing incentive, combined with the borrower's ability to be approved for a new mortgage (reflecting home price appreciation and the borrower's credit situation) affect the likelihood of prepayments from refinancing.

Prepayments affect MBS investors in three ways:

  1. Uncertainty about when or at what rate prepayments will occur leads to uncertainty about the length of time the MBS will remain outstanding and the schedule of principal cash flows that will be received. This can be a problem for investors who are trying to match the maturity of a liability.
  2. MBS prepayments are made at par ($100). An MBS investor who paid a premium will lose the premium on the prepaid principal; an investor who bought at a discount will also receive par, resulting in a gain.
  3. Reinvestment risk: Since prepayments rise as rates fall, investors will generally receive more principal to reinvest when rates are low, and less principal to reinvest when rates are high.

Investors can measure their prepayment risk via computerized models that have been developed by the major broker dealer firms like Lehman Brothers, Bear Steams, Merrill Lynch and others. These models will predict how fast prepayments will come in on a monthly basis under different interest rate scenarios while taking into consideration various factors like the time of year, geographic economic patterns and housing migration data.

Interest rate risk
Interest rates affect the value of all fixed income securities in one way or another. In particular, interest rate movement is very closely tied to the trading and evaluation of MBS securities and CMOs because it will affect prepayment rates. For example, when interest rates increase and mortgage rates increase the expected rate of prepayment will decrease and certain MBS product may extend in duration and average life. These longer bonds will either be worth more or worth less depending on their structure. For example, if an investor owns an interest only (I0) bond, he would receive interest payments for a longer period of time and thus receive a higher rate of return. Conversely, when rates drop and mortgage rates decrease, refinancing and housing turnover in general will increase. This will have the effect of shortening the average life of most MBS. Bonds bought at a discount will experience an increase in yield and bonds bought at a premium will result in lower yields in this case. Some examples of these bullish securities would be inverse floaters and principle only strips. As you can see, interest rate risk is not a simple, one dimensional risk in the MBS market. Because of the ability to structure bonds according to the needs of the investor, bullish and bearish bonds can be created and used for investing and hedging in many different interest rate scenarios.

Yield curve risk
The shape of the yield curve is very important when analyzing the risk of MBS. The shape of the curve is measured by looking at the difference in yields between two places on the yield curve. The most common measure of curve shape is the difference in yield between the long bond and the two-year note. The curve can be characterized as "steep" (when the difference in yield is large), flat (a smaller difference than when it was "steep") or inverted (a negative difference in yield). This concept of curve shape is important because long rates and short rates affect the Mortgage market differently. Long rates determine fixed rate mortgage rates and are closely tracked when watching prepayment speed expectations. Short rates are influenced largely by Federal Reserve policy and affect any LIBOR risk that may be inherent in a structured MBS. Curve shape becomes important when evaluating certain mortgage product such as inverse IOs. Inverse IOs are worth more in a steep yield curve environment because you have high long rates (which means slow prepayments) and low short rates (which means LIBOR is low and you are maximizing your coupon income). As the curve flattens, the values of these securities will usually decline. These securities are complex in nature and have many different kinds of risk embedded in them. One must be very familiar with the various structures of CMOs to understand how curve movement or interest rate movement will affect their value.

Index risk
When we speak about an index we are referring to the following: LIBOR, COFI, and Prime rate. Each of these indices is published and used in a uniform fashion by the financial community in evaluating certain MBS product. Many MBS derivative products have a coupon tied to one of these indices, For example, if one buys an inverse floater with an index tied to LIBOR, as LIBOR decreases, coupon payments increase (hence the name "inverse" floater) and vice versa. This is considered a very bullish instrument. If the security is a floater, the coupon will adjust in the same direction as LIBOR. Floaters are generally neutral to bearish instruments. The index risk is greater when securities are financed and the financing cost is tied to an index other than the index to which the coupon is tied.

Duration risk
Modified duration is a measure of price sensitivity to changes in yields. Specifically, it is an estimate of the percentage change in the price of a security if treasury yields change. Effective duration is modified duration further adjusted by a prepayment model, which estimates MBS price changes as a function of Prepayment rate movements as well as interest rate changes. Effective duration is important to the valuation of prepayment sensitive securities. One can see the significance of this difference when analyzing an inverse floater: the high yields of most inverses produce short modified duration that would substantially understate price sensitivity. Effective duration is therefore a better guide to price sensitivity and volatility.

Note: Weighted Average Life is different from Duration. Weighted Average Life (WAL) is the weighted average time to receipt of principal for a given pass-through or CMO.

Structure risk
CMOs come in many different shapes and sizes. As mentioned above, they can be customized to fit the financial needs and objectives of investors. Today, many CMO structures have complicated formulas for allocating prepayment risk among the various classes. This prepayment risk will often change over time as certain bonds pay off. Knowing that a security has a high initial yield will not necessarily protect an investor from potential problems if interest rates move, prepayment rates move or spreads widen. One must be able to analyze and understand the complete structure of the CMO deal, as well as the structure of the security that they may be interested in buying within that deal. It will ultimately be the entire structure of the CMO deal and the structure of the individual bond within the CMO deal that will affect the value of the bond the investor owns.

Glossary

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